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Nil: The Value of Patents in a Major Crisis
Such as an Influenza Pandemic
∗

Dennis D. Crouch
I.

INTRODUCTION

Classic patent theory relies on an incentive model to justify the
1
grant of exclusionary patent rights. Under the model, potential patent rights provide an incentive to those who would set about the task
of innovating. In constitutional language, this incentive operates to
2
“promote the progress” in the “useful arts.” Patents are only one
tool of innovation policy, and we regularly find innovation even in
3
the absence of any direct governmental sponsorship or activity. In
this essay, I focus on the role of patents in relation to a potential
global crisis such as an influenza pandemic or other public health crisis.
Part II considers the reality that patent rights will be largely ignored during an epidemic and that any post-crisis compensation
would likely be low when compared to traditional patent rewards or
settlements entered under threat of injunctive relief. In some situations, such as use of a patented invention by a state or local govern4
ment, a patentee may have no recourse. Part III raises a separate issue that stems from the relatively long time frame for obtaining
∗
Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. This paper is
adapted from a speech delivered at the Seton Hall Law Review Symposium: Preparing
for a Pharmaceutical Response to Pandemic Influenza. See Dennis Crouch, Intellectual Property in a Public Health Crisis, PATENTLY-O, Oct. 22, 2008,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/10/intellectual-pr.html. Special thanks to
Patently-O blog readers who provided often anonymous comments on my original
topic outline.
1
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 11–12 (2003); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1024–
30 (1989); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 266 (1977) (incentive to invent).
2
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 8, cl. 8.
3
See, e.g., Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation
and Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006).
4
See infra notes 28–32.
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patent rights as compared with the time frame of an epidemic. Patent rights are only obtained through the typically slow process of patent prosecution. Consequently, innovation triggered by the onset of
an epidemic might not be protected by patent rights until well after
the crisis has abated. This realization suggests that the role of patents
rests with longer-term preparation and follow-up, rather than with
protecting innovations triggered by the specific crisis itself. Part IV
considers how these diminished patent rights alter the incentive to
innovate. As foreshadowed, I conclude that patent rights offer little
innovation incentive in the face of an impending crisis. Optimistically, under this same formulation, patents may provide an incentive to
ensure that the crisis is never realized. Part V recognizes that innovation still takes place in the absence of enforceable patent rights. A
wide variety of incentives play a role in producing innovation, and
reduced patent value does not mean that innovation will end or necessarily be reduced. I suggest that the absence of strong patent rights
may well be good for crisis policy.
For brevity, this essay primarily focuses on treatment of practical
and legal issues within the borders of the United States. The title of
the essay, “Nil,” is a bald overstatement, although some nuance is required before discovering the value of patents in a global crisis such
as an influenza pandemic. With hope, the value comes in helping to
generate innovations that aid in preparing for these crises and prevent such crises from ever being realized.
II. PATENTS AS NON-ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS DURING AN EPIDEMIC
The political reality is easy to understand. Governments have
taken significant steps to combat health crises in the past, and will not
avoid the temptation to ignore patent rights when an underlying innovation is needed to respond to a crisis such as a health related epi5
demic. I postulate a formula—that during a public health crisis the
government will ignore any patent rights if (1) the patented technol-

5
See generally Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding as constitutional a Massachusetts law authorizing a city or town to make smallpox vaccinations mandatory for all residents); Ernest B. Abbott, Law, Federalism, the Constitution,
and Control of Pandemic Flu, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 185, 186–204 (2008) (evaluating
the scope of government authority to protect from a public health emergency);
Christopher T. Nidel, Public Health, Hypocrisy, and Brown-Skinned People, 59 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 355 (2004) (discussing the ability of sovereign governments to use their
police powers to remove private rights to combat a public health crisis); J. Kelly
Strader, Criminalization as a Policy Response to a Public Health Crisis, 27 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 435 (1994) (discussing government actions to criminalize activities which increase the threat of HIV exposure).
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ogy will aid in resolving the crisis and (2) a favorable license is not
readily available. In the United States, the Supreme Court arguably
endorsed such a doctrine in its 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercEx6
change, LLC. EBay formalized the notion that a court must consider
the public impact before issuing an injunction to block infringing ac7
tivities. Before eBay, injunctive relief was regularly awarded as a matter of course once the patentee proved infringement of a valid patent. Yet, in those heady days of strong exclusionary rights, public
health concerns could still be sufficient to lead a court away from is8
suing injunctive relief. For example, in City of Milwaukee v. Activated
Sludge, Inc., the Seventh Circuit denied the patentee’s request for injunctive relief, even though the patent had been deemed valid and
9
infringed. According to the court, the proposed relief of shutting
down the infringing sewage treatment process would have wreaked
too much havoc on the public interest:
If . . . the injunction ordered by the trial court is made permanent
in this case, it would close the sewage plant, leaving the entire
community without any means for the disposal of raw sewage other than running it into Lake Michigan, thereby polluting its water
and endangering the health and lives of that and other adjoining
communities. . . . [W]here, as here, the health and the lives of
more than a half a million people are involved, we think no risk
should be taken, and we feel impelled to deny appellee’s conten10
tion.

6

See 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
See id. at 391; see also Julie A. Burger & Justin Brunner, A Court’s Dilemma: When
Patents Conflict with Public Health, 12 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, ¶¶ 71–127 (2007),
http://www.vjolt.net/vol12/issue4/v12i4_a1-Burger.pdf (suggesting mechanisms for
extending the public interest factor); Henry E. Smith, Institutions and Indirectness
in Intellectual Property, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2131 (2009) (suggesting that the
public interest factor is treated as a narrowly applied “safety valve”).
8
See City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577, 593 (7th Cir.
1934).
9
Id.
10
Id. Ethicists and theologians have argued that a patent holder is ethically obligated to open access to needed inventions during special emergencies. See Gabriel J.
Michael, Catholic Thought and Intellectual Property: Learning from the Ethics of Obligation,
25
J.L.
&
RELIGION
(forthcoming
Spring
2010),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349769. Beyond ethics, in a true major public health crisis, it is unlikely that a company with an ongoing business interest—especially a
pharmaceutical company with close governmental-regulatory ties—would seek injunctive relief unless the patentee was convinced that it could supply the entire market without complaints of access. In line with this rule of marketing, some patentee
litigants have elected to request only continuing damages for ongoing infringement
rather than seeking permanent injunctive relief. For instance, in a suit charging Eli
Lilly with infringement for the sale of its osteoporosis drug Evista, the plaintiffs only
7
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City of Milwaukee is an older case. A more recent example directly related to health epidemics involved Bayer’s patent on Ciprofloxicin
11
(“Cipro”). In 2001, Congress and President George W. Bush’s administration were reported to have seriously considered “breaking”
Bayer’s patent on Cipro in order to stockpile the drug against a po12
tential anthrax attack. Instead, the federal government reportedly
used the threat of breaking the patent to negotiate a long-term con13
tract with Bayer at an unusually low price. This approach might be
termed “bending” the patent, as discussed below.
The Cipro case is important because it may help define the ambiguous terms “crisis” and “epidemic” within political realities. The
“crisis” in the Cipro case was not an immediate need for medication
to treat affected persons, but was instead a desire to stockpile medication in preparation for a potential threat. In the end, the threat did
not materialize and no stockpile was necessary. In hindsight it appears that the crisis, like many health crises of the past, was primarily
14
a political crisis. The Cipro case also helps reflect on the notion
that, in order to avoid a “broken” patent, the offered license must be
15
favorable for the government.
None of the reported post-eBay injunctive relief decisions involve
either governmental infringement or a potential crisis-like need. Yet,
even without those indicators, courts have denied injunctive relief in

sought “monetary damages, including but not limited to a reasonable royalty for Defendant Lilly’s current and future infringement.” Complaint at 2, Ariad Pharms.,
Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D. Mass. 2005) (No. 02-cv-11280), 2002
WL 33027597.
11
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (discussing the patent in relation to allegedly anticompetitive settlement
agreements), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).
12
Daniel R. Cahoy, Treating the Legal Side Effects of Cipro: A Reevaluation of Compensation Rules for Government Takings of Patent Rights, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 126–27
(2002).
13
Id. at 127.
14
Cf. LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 393–95
(2d ed. 2008) (discussing the political background of the 1976 swine flu immunization program); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, THE EPIDEMIC THAT
NEVER WAS: POLICY-MAKING AND THE SWINE FLU SCARE 27–28 (rev. ed., Vintage Books
1983) (1982) (same); N. Pieter M. O’Leary, Bioterrorism or Avian Influenza: California,
The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, and Protecting Civil Liberties During a Public
Health Emergency, 42 CAL. W. L. REV. 249, 280–85 (2006) (discussing specific limits in a
proposed California Emergency Health Powers Act that may limit political overreaching).
15
Admittedly, external factors such as regulatory capture or governmental leadership ineffectiveness may alter this outcome and provide an avenue for a patentee
to negotiate more favorable agreements.
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16

a substantial number of recent cases. In z4 Techs, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., for instance, the Court refused to grant the patentee an injunction to stop Microsoft from continuing to infringe its software pa17
tent. In Paice, LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., the patentee was refused an
18
injunction to stop Toyota from continuing to infringe. In both cases, relief was denied primarily because (1) the patentees failed to
prove that continued infringement caused any irreparable harm and
(2) injunctive relief would have been burdensome because the patented invention implicated only small portions of much larger
19
products. The courts here are not completely devaluing the patent
right, but their denial of permanent relief shifts the situation from
one in which strong property rules are applied to a regime of liability
20
rules.
I should take a moment here to define my terms of “breaking”
and “bending” patents. A patent’s underlying value is in its legal and
apparent exclusionary power. A “broken” patent might be defined as
a patent whose rights are willfully ignored without recourse. A patent
that is merely “bent” may have only suffered under the threat of be16

See cases cited infra note 18.
434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440–41, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
18
No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d in
part, vacated on other grounds, 504 F.3d 1293, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also, Dennis
Crouch, Injunction Granted to TiVo; Injunction Denied in Favor of Toyota, PATENTLY-O,
Aug. 18, 2006, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/08/injunction_gran.html.
For other recent cases where permanent injunctive relief has been denied, see Armando v. Microsoft Corp., 517 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Telcordia Techs., Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc.,
592 F. Supp. 2d 727 (D. Del. 2009); Voile Mfg. Corp. v. Dandurand, 551 F. Supp. 2d
1301 (D. Utah 2008) (preliminary injunction denied); MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay,
Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007); IMX, Inc. v. Lendingtree, LLC, 469 F.
Supp. 2d 203 (D. Del. 2007) (denied without prejudice); Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte
Fabricating, Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007); Finisar
Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380 (E.D.
Tex. July 7, 2006); Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
37961 (W.D. Okla. June 8, 2006).
19
z4Techs., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 444; Paice, LLC, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4–5.
20
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1119–20 (1972). Injunctive relief is generally considered a higher value reward than ongoing monetary
damages. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007). In essence, injunctive relief puts full control of the
intellectual property in the hands of the patentee who is then in a strong position to
name a settlement price or even to refuse to settle. There is no settled theory for calculating ongoing damages for patent infringement. See Paice, LLC v. Toyota Motor
Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313–15 (Fed. Cir. 2007)(suggesting one method for calculating such damages). Thus, it is possible that a proper ongoing damage calculation
would actually be greater than the potential settlement price.
17
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ing broken or perhaps is only partially broken. In the context of this
paper, the breaking and bending of patents is assumed to occur by,
21
or on behalf of, governmental entities. Because the United States
government has largely waived its rights of sovereign immunity and
allows private patent holders to sue the government for infringe22
ment, the government is unlikely to break patents entirely.
Allegations of patent infringement against the federal government must be brought in the Court of Federal Claims (CFC), which
imposes procedural requirements that limit some of the potential pa23
tent rights available. The CFC does not offer a right to jury trial,
disallows injunctive relief, disallows enhanced or punitive damages
for willful infringement of patent rights, disallows relief for some
would-be infringing activities, and eliminates the potential for actions
against private contractors authorized to infringe by the federal gov24
ernment. Section 1498 provides the only practical mechanism for
pursuing actions against the federal government; other legal mechan25
isms, such as takings claims, have been largely unsuccessful. Courts
do not ordinarily consider patent infringement by the government to
26
be an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment. Although the term ‘compulsory license’ is not used in the statute, these
limitations on rights allow the federal government to bend patent
rights by declaring a compulsory license to use patented inventions
without first obtaining any rights.

21

The assumption that breaking patents is restricted to governmental activities is
not necessary for the arguments, but it merely simplifies the issues treated in the paper. Although not directly parallel, Mark Lemley rightly suggests that private entities
ignore many patent rights. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV.
19, 21 (2008).
22
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006).
23
Id. § 1498(a), (b), (e).
24
Id; see also Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
25
See Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353; Cahoy, supra note 12, at 175. Furthermore, during
a crisis, ordinary takings principles do not apply as the government applies police
power to achieve its public purposes. See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268 (1870);
Teresi v. California, 225 Cal. Rptr. 517, 518–19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that
damages resulting from a police-power response to an extreme emergency are excepted from the constitutional requirement that compensation be paid for property
taken for public use); In re N.J.A.C. 11:1-20, 505 A.2d 177, 182, 185 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986) (emergency measures enacted to protect public health did not constitute a taking); Royal C. Gardner, Invoking Private Property Rights for Environmental
Purposes: The Takings Implications of Government-Authorized Aerial Pesticide Spraying, 18
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 65, 88–93 (1999).
26
Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1353.
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Individual states may also apply pressure and threaten unautho27
rized use. In fact, for several reasons, the threat of patent breaking
by individual states is heightened. First, states generally have not
waived their sovereign immunity against patent infringement ac28
tions. State immunity from suit derives from the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which protects states from “[t]he Judi29
cial power of the United States.” The Supreme Court has held that
state immunity goes beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment and
30
is also rooted in “the structure of the original Constitution itself.”
In Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, the
Supreme Court held that states may assert sovereign immunity as a
31
defense against charges of patent infringement. In addition to sovereign immunity, practical considerations may also push state and local governments away from providing compensation for use of a patented invention. Less money is available. State and local budgets are
dramatically lower than those of the federal government. Additionally, unlike the federal government, state and local governments often
32
abide by strict budgeting principles.
The governing international agreement—the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)—includes additional
provisions that legitimize patent breaking in limited circumstances
such as a national emergency. When this occurs, TRIPS indicates
27

See infra notes 28–32.
See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 635 (1999); Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469,
472 (1999); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011 (2000); Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of
State Sovereign Immunity from Infringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1339, 1401 (2000); Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual
Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1161, 1161 (2000); Ernest A Young, State Sovereign Immunity
and the Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 13–16 (1999).
29
U.S. CONST. amend. XI; State Sovereign Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
and its Effects on Intellectual Property Enforcement, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement
of Q. Todd Dickinson, Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office), available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/106s/dickinson0727.htm.
30
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728 (1999).
31
See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 647–48 (1999). Although Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908), provides a
limited exception to the state immunity doctrine by allowing plaintiffs to sue state
officials for injunctive relief rather than suing the state itself, that doctrine has seen
little success in modern patent cases.
32
Michael Abramowicz, Speeding the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 158
(2003). As a practical matter, innovations that could be easily replicated in a decentralized fashion would be locally without recourse.
28
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that the patentee should eventually receive some compensation based
33
on “the economic value of the authorization.” In all likelihood,
however, that ex-post payment will be a small fraction of the potential
34
monopoly profits that could have been earned.
The bottom line here is that—in an emergent crisis—
government entities will likely have both the legal right and political
mandate to bend if not break patent rights over innovations deemed
important in resolving the crisis.
III. THE NON-CRISIS TIME FRAME OF PATENTS
Time Frame of the innovation and patenting processes also matter. In many likely scenarios, the crisis may pass before patent rights
become available. Patent protection is not automatic. Rather, it in35
volves a substantive examination process that often takes years. This
delay in perfecting rights is relevant when considering the role of patent rights during a crisis such as a health epidemic. In cases where
innovation is spurred by the crisis itself, the innovator may have only
36
fleeting hope of quickly obtaining patent protection. This situation
is quite likely to arise in a health crisis where anti-viral or antimicrobial treatments are engineered only after isolating the offensive
37
biologic agent.

33

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 31,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. Article 31 includes several specific limits on when a country can issue compulsory licenses of privately held
patents. For instance, each use must be considered on its individual merit, efforts
must be made to obtain authorization from the rights holder, the use should be predominantly for the domestic market of the authorizing member nation, and the
compulsory use must be revoked when it is no longer needed.
34
Dennis Crouch, Intellectual Property in a Public Health Crisis, PATENTLY-O, Oct. 22,
2008, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/10/intellectual-pr.html.
35
In a 2009 study of 20,000+ prosecution history files, I found that more than fifty percent of patent applications are still pending three-years after filing. See Dennis
Crouch, Patent Application Pendency: Percent of Applications Still Pending, PATENTLY-O,
July 17, 2009, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/07/patent-applicationpendency-percent-of-applications-still-pending.html. In addition, most patents actually claim priority to one or more priority documents such as prior patent applications, foreign patent applications, or provisional patent applications. See Dennis
Crouch, Priority Claims in Issued Patents, PATENTLY-O, July 26, 2009,
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/07/priority-claims-in-issued-patents.html.
These successive filings further add to the pendency period. Time is also required to
prepare patent application materials before filing, thus further pushing back the
eventual effective date of the issued patent.
36
See supra note 35.
37
This is the procedure used annually to create the influenza vaccine. See Audio
recording: Matthew Reynolds, Centers for Disease Control, 2007–2008 Influenza
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During pendency of the application, the applicant has no right
to stop would-be infringement. A limited statutory provision does
38
provide “provisional rights” and back damages after issuance, but
that provision is so narrowly drafted that ten years after its 1999 passage, a comprehensive online search failed to reveal a single reported
decision indicating that an infringer had been held liable for provi39
sional damages.
The timing of a crisis could be weeks, months, or potentially
years. That timing makes a difference in patent law. In the same way
that light waves act differently around objects whose size is on the
40
same order as the light wavelength, patent law only becomes applicable if a patent may issue before the crisis is complete. Before the
patent issues, the invention may be used without recourse under the
patent laws. Even after issuance, however, infringers do not simply
pay their share of compensation. Patent litigation typically consumes
years and, as discussed above, high value awards of injunctive relief
would be unlikely in the midst of a crisis.
IV. THE INCENTIVE TO INNOVATE OFFERED BY PATENT LAW
IN A CRISIS SITUATION
Parts II and III developed the notion that innovators will have
diminished or even nonexistent patent rights during a public health
crisis situation. This part briefly considers how these diminished patent rights alter the incentive to innovate. Patent law operates under
the assumption that the promise of strong patent rights provides an
41
incentive to innovate. If the law offers weaker rights, a potential innovator will presumably feel marginally less inclined to pursue the
innovation. Following that premise, we expect that the reduced
strength of patent rights during a public health crisis would likely reVaccine Production and Distribution, available at http://www2a.cdc.gov/podcasts/
download.asp?f=6678&af=t.
38
35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (2006).
39
To conduct this study, I broadly searched for mention of the provisional rights
statute in the federal case law databases of LexisNexis and Westlaw. I also performed
a parallel search using the Lexmachina docket search database. In one case, a district court denied a pretrial motion to preclude a plaintiff from seeking provisional
rights. First Years, Inc. v. Munchkin, Inc., No. 07-cv-558-bbc, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
70482, at *6 (W.D. Wisc., Sept. 17, 2008). However, that case settled before the court
made any further substantive ruling.
40
DAVID BREWSTER, A TREATISE ON OPTICS 95 (London, Longman, Rees, Orme,
Brown
&
Green
1831),
available
at
http://books.google.com/
books?id=opYAAAAAMAAJ.
41
Dennis Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common
Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 141 (2008).
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duce the incentive to innovate targeted solutions. As I discuss in a
recently published paper on the patent lottery effect, the exact relationship between potential rights and incentive to innovate is difficult
42
to define. Thus, although it is well established that patent rights
create an incentive to invent, no one knows the exact incentive impact of shifts in the strength of patent rights. However, despite challenges to the assumption of incentives, the general theory has largely
sat well with its commentators for hundreds of years.
Although patent rights may fail to provide full incentives to develop responses to an epidemic, I am cautiously optimistic that patents do have some role in preparing for a crisis. The loss of rights described in Parts II and III results from either the critical public need
for access to the invention during a major crisis or the short timeline
of the crisis. Patents can still provide a strong incentive to create innovations that help prepare for and prevent potential crises, since
governments are less likely to upset patent rights outside of the crisis
43
situation. Thus, the remaining incentive pushes innovators toward
mechanisms that prevent the crisis from forming in the first place.
V. INNOVATION WILL HAPPEN: ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
TO CRISIS INNOVATION
This section briefly considers alternative approaches to crisis innovation. A simple model of the decision to innovate considers the
additional value of the various incentives and disincentives. A tremendous amount of innovation occurs without any external stimulus
44
or incentive. As discussed above, in some situations, patents can
provide additional incentives. Ordinarily, patent rights help prevent
free riding by follow-on copycats, thus allowing the patentee to generate revenue based on the innovation. At times, patentees can use
contract rights to achieve the same result. Notably, rights can be controlled through contracts such as confidentiality agreements and ma-

42

Id.
Some patents that would be potentially useful in a crisis may have non-crisis
uses that are substantial enough to provide innovators incentive to invest in research
and development. Cipro and oseltamivir phosphate (Tamiflu) are two such examples. In those cases, the innovation may still be developed despite an understanding
that the patent rights may be ignored in a crisis situation. The crisis value could be
seen as a spillover benefit.
44
This natural innovation might be seen as simply human nature, since many
humans are naturally innovative and enjoy the process.
43
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45

terial transfer agreements (MTAs). In some areas of technology,
these contractual rights can be quite strong especially where the in46
novation is difficult and expensive to reproduce. For instance, Professor O’Connor identifies MTAs as particularly strong in stem cell
research because the value is in the stem cell line itself, rather than in
the idea of how to create a stem cell:
The recent focus on patents as a hindrance to stem cell research
may turn out to be a red herring. The real culprits are material
transfer agreements (MTAs), which govern the transfer of cell
lines and other biological materials. The MTA’s primary purpose
in life sciences research is to set contractual rights and obligations
between parties where one party transfers biological materials to
the other. For example, MTAs often focus on the physical handling, use, and distribution of the materials by the recipient, ensuring that the recipient complies with regulations for research
involving humans or animals. Although these interests are legitimate, evidence indicates that owners of important biological research materials use their nonpatent property rights to require
recipient consent to arguably onerous MTAs, which include provisions governing intellectual property rights (IPR). When an intended recipient’s institution refuses to sign the MTA, the researcher cannot access the biological materials, and in some cases
cannot pursue her research.47

A surprising study recently confirmed the power of the MTAs when it
determined that MTAs and confidentiality agreements create more of
48
a hindrance to agricultural research than opposing patent rights.
In crisis preparation, the greatest incentive may come from direct government support through public funding of research and
emergency preparations. This managed innovation makes sense in
the absence of patent rights, but even if patents were largely enforceable, we might not expect that innovators would necessarily choose to
invest in crisis preparation. In this context, the problem with the patent regime is that it broadly offers a promise of rights without directing innovators toward any particular area of innovation. Thus, al45

See generally Sean O’Connor, The Use of MTAs to Control Commercialization of Stem
Cell Diagnostics and Therapeutics, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017 (2006) (discussing the
use of MTAs as a source of property protection).
46
See id. at 1017–18.
47
Id.
48
Zhen Lei, Rakhi Juneja & Brian D. Wright, Patents Versus Patenting: Implications
of Intellectual Property Protection for Biological Research, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 36
(2009), available at http://www.nature.com/nbt/journal/v27/n1/pdf/nbt010936.pdf; see also Posting of Kevin Noonan to Patent Docs, http://www.patentdocs.org
(Feb. 3, 2009, 11:38 p.m.) (critiquing the study conclusions).
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though patents may serve as useful tools for generally fueling innovation, the broad range of potentially protectable subject matter means
that any one particular innovation remains unlikely. Even if monopoly-level returns could be expected for a patentee whose innovation
aided in solving a major crisis, there is no guarantee that a potential
innovator would take the risk, especially after taking into account the
low probability that the planned-for crisis would occur.
In addition to providing up-front funding, the government may
also provide prior contracts and guarantees that rights will not be violated even in a crisis. Where forethought is possible, a cooperative
agreement could guarantee public access to innovative products and
guarantee that developers are repaid. If this solution is done through
a statutory or regulatory framework, it may be necessary to do so
through federal action because of the preemptive nature of the pa49
tent laws.
VI. CONCLUSION
Potential patent rights fail to provide a strong incentive to innovate solutions to a potential major crisis such as a health epidemic. In
some cases, patent rights may spur innovation that prevents a crisis
altogether. In other cases, however, more directed management will
be necessary.

49

See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989)
(holding that Florida statute providing “patent-like protection for ideas deemed unprotected under the present federal scheme” was preempted by the Supremacy
Clause).

